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I NTE RNATI O NAL
AD JUD I CATI ON: A
RE S P O NS E TO
PAULUS—COURTS ,
CUS TO M, TRE ATI E S ,
RE G I ME S , AND THE
WTO
................................................................................................................................................................

donald h. regan*

I. Introduction

.........................................................................................................................................................................................................
I am pleased to have the opportunity to respond to Andreas Paulus’s very interesting
contribution, and to elaborate on some of the matters he raises. As will be all too
obvious, I am not an expert on general public international law. I undertook this
assignment in the hope that I would learn something (as I have), and that I would
eventually think of something useful to say (less clear). Happily, the one area of
international law where I do have some expertise is the law of the World Trade
Organization (WTO). The WTO is often used as an example in discussions of the
‘fragmentation’ of international law, which is one of the problems Paulus discusses,
so I hope some remarks at the end about how the WTO and its Appellate Body
∗ For helpful discussion of this chapter I thank Samantha Besson, Andreas Paulus, Bruno Simma, and John
Tasioulas. All views expressed are my own.
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handle problems of conﬂicting values may be useful. But I shall begin with more
general issues.

II. Courts and Custom

.........................................................................................................................................................................................................
What are judges doing when they adjudicate cases involving international law? The
ﬁrst way we might hope to answer this question is by denying that there is any
special problem about international adjudication. Judges deciding international law
cases are doing the same thing judges do when they decide cases under domestic
law, except that the substantive law is different, and from different sources. Of
course, even if we could say this, it would not solve our problem. There is no
agreement about just what judges are doing in domestic adjudication. To remind
the reader of the obvious, we have never found an uncontroversial solution to two
related puzzles or problems about (domestic) adjudication: (1) However much we
may have imbibed the lessons of legal realism and its philosophical descendants,
we still want it to be the case that there is some sort of law/politics divide. Crudely,
we want to believe that legislatures make the law and judges apply it. But of course,
the law is often not clear. So the question is, what is the judge doing in the area
of opacity? If we want particular cases to be decided by general rules knowable
in advance, how can a judge produce a legitimate decision in a particular case
where the rules have (or appear to have) run out? (2) Another puzzle, related
but distinct, is that we want the law to be both knowable and ideally moral or
just (for the circumstances). In practice, these two desiderata are likely to be in
tension in many instances. So, assimilating international adjudication to domestic
adjudication would not remotely solve the problem of understanding international
adjudication. But it would at least mean that we did not have a new problem, and it
would give us a large literature ready-made.
Unfortunately for this ‘assimilationist’ approach, international law and adjudication are different from domestic law and adjudication in signiﬁcant ways, some
of which seem important when we are thinking about the role of the judge. For a
start, it is not clear that there is even a single type of ‘international adjudication’.
We now have a vast range of international tribunals, with remarkably different
tasks. For example, a large part of the business of the International Court of Justice
(ICJ) consists of identifying and applying general principles of law and customary
international law. The Appellate Body of the WTO, in contrast, is mainly concerned
to interpret and apply one large and complex treaty. The International Criminal
Court (ICC) and the special international criminal tribunals, even though they
must inevitably decide some questions of general international law, are primarily
concerned with fact-ﬁnding.
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Paulus notes brieﬂy that international courts differ from domestic courts in having
no fully compulsory jurisdiction and no reliable coercive enforcement mechanism,
and he suggests that this ‘changes the character’ of international adjudication.1
But the reality is complex, and I am not sure in any event that the differences
here between domestic and international adjudication change the task of the judge.
The international criminal tribunals (including the ICC) have fully compulsory
jurisdiction over the defendants brought before them, although of course they are
dependent on other agencies to produce those defendants. The Appellate Body of
the WTO has compulsory jurisdiction over all WTO Members; the only way to
avoid the jurisdiction is to withdraw from the treaty. Even the ICJ has what is often
referred to as ‘compulsory’ jurisdiction, a general jurisdiction granted conditionally
by states in advance of particular disputes under the ICJ Statute article 36.2, although
of course no state is required to grant such jurisdiction, and a disgruntled state
can always withdraw it prospectively. With regard to enforcement, the criminal
tribunals again can expect their judgments to be coercively enforced. That is not
true of either the WTO Appellate Body or the ICJ, but compliance with judgments
of these bodies has been reasonably high nonetheless,2 presumably because of a
combination of reputational pressure and the losing party’s commitment to the
existence and efﬁcacy of the relevant international system.
Still, it is true that most international courts differ to some degree from domestic
courts with regard to the compulsoriness of their jurisdiction and the enforceability
of their judgments (or the expectation of compliance). The question is, does this
make any difference to what the court is doing when it decides an individual case?
So far as I can see, it does not. The central role of a court is to answer questions that
are brought to it about the state of the law.3 A court with no compulsory jurisdiction
will be asked fewer questions; and a court whose judgments are unenforceable may
expect its judgments to have somewhat less effect on the world; but still, there is
no obvious reason why the court’s approach to deciding what the law says should
be affected. The absence of courts with fully compulsory jurisdiction and fully
enforceable judgments may or may not be a problem for the international system;
but I do not see that the lack of compulsory jurisdiction or enforcement is a problem
for the court itself.
A much more important difference between international courts and domestic
courts is the ‘sources of law’ that they rely on. For domestic courts, the sources
of law are constitutions, statutes or codes, administrative regulations, and in some
systems, judicial precedent (and also in some systems international law, but this
1
2

Paulus, A., ‘International Adjudication’, Chapter 9 in this volume, 208.
With regard to the ICJ, see generally Schulte, C., Compliance with Decisions of the International Court of
Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).
3 I ignore the fact-ﬁnding role, not because it is unimportant, but because it is relatively unproblematic
philosophically.
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will be relevant to at most a small number of domestic cases). These domestic sources
of law are for the most part easily identiﬁed. Of course these sources still require
interpretation, and there is room for enormous controversy about interpretation,
both at the level of hermeneutics and of exegesis. But still, it is usually reasonably
clear what the texts are that need to be interpreted and applied. That is not true
in general for international adjudication. The Statute of the ICJ lists as sources
of law: international conventions (general or particular), ‘international custom, as
evidence of a general practice accepted as law’, and ‘the general principles of law
recognized by civilised nations’.4 International conventions, including treaties, are
easily identiﬁable. (Treaties raise other problems, which I shall discuss in section III.)
But the other sources are not easily identiﬁed; identifying the source may be the
hardest part of the adjudicative project.
Taken at face value, the deﬁnition of what is known as ‘customary international
law’ seems to require a broad empirical investigation into the behaviour of nations
and the attitudes behind that behaviour. The ICJ is widely thought to have revised
the conception of custom in the Nicaragua case, so that even a putative norm that
is frequently violated may count as ‘custom’ if violators consistently offer some
justiﬁcation for their violation.5 This reduces the importance of uniform practice
and elevates the importance of opinio juris, but it does not eliminate the need for
extensive empirical investigation. Nor does it eliminate the possibility for spirited
disagreement about whether some supposed custom exists. Some scholars want to
move beyond Nicaragua and base customary law on the pronouncements of international assemblies, and congresses, and the like—signiﬁcantly de-emphasizing
questions about the practice or rhetorical behaviour of individual states.6 On this
view, it is the role of the court (assisted, of course, by scholars) to say when a norm
that is announced or adumbrated in a variety of often largely hortatory documents
has crystallized into international law. At this point, the courts are being asked to
play a role that hardly seems like ‘adjudication’ at all. But if the demand on judges at
this extreme end of the spectrum of views about custom seems clearly unacceptable
(at least to me), the same sort of demand is already being made even at the other
end of the spectrum, under the most traditional view of custom. Even here, the
judge plays a role in identifying the law to be applied that is quite different from
the judge’s usual role in domestic systems. Familiarity with this scheme has bred
acceptance—familiarity and necessity. In the international system, where there
is no general legislature, we must recognize customary law if there is to be any
4 Statute of the ICJ, article 38. Also, as ‘subsidiary means’, non-binding precedent and ‘the teachings of the
most highly qualiﬁed publicists’. For a much fuller discussion of the sources of international law, see Samantha
Besson, ‘Theorizing the Sources of International Law’, Chapter 7 in this volume, 163.
5 ICJ, Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America)
(ICJ Reports 1986), 14 (see esp. paras. 186, 202).
6 e.g. Charney, J., ‘Universal International Law’, American Journal of International Law, 87 (1993), 529,
543–50.
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universally applicable (i.e., non-treaty-based) positive law at all. But familiar or not,
the role of the international court in identifying and applying customary law in a
controversial case is very different from the role of a domestic court.
In the central section of his paper, Paulus discusses three approaches to international adjudication; the ‘functionalist’ approach, the ‘liberal’ approach, and the
‘post-modern’ approach. The discussion of the functionalist approach focuses on
the problem of ‘fragmentation’ of international law; this problem arises largely
from the multiplication of treaties, and we will take it up in section III. But in the
discussions of both the ‘post-modern’ approach and the ‘liberal’ approach, Paulus
is grappling with the same problems that bedevil our understanding of domestic
adjudication, except that in the international sphere the problems are magniﬁed by
the absence of a legislature or a true world community. The post-modern view of
international adjudication is a response to the puzzle about what judges are doing,
or should do, when they decide a case where the lex lata is unclear, a puzzle that we
have encountered in the domestic sphere. But as we have seen, in the international
sphere the absence of a legislature means the judge must ﬁrst identify the law before
applying it. Hence a ‘political’ contribution by the judge seems even more inevitable
in the international sphere, and the magnitude of the political contribution greater.
Similarly, calls for ‘liberal’ international law, coupled with Paulus’s warning that
international law must not simply exclude non-liberal regimes lest it ‘endanger
the peace-making role of international adjudication’,7 reﬂect the tension between
wanting the law to be ideally moral or just, on the one hand, and wanting it to
be knowable and effective on the other—again, a problem we have encountered
in the domestic sphere. This problem is magniﬁed in the international context
because there is no international polity with common values except in the thinnest
sense. To be sure, even in the national context, any appeal to community values
inevitably overrides some conﬂicting views on the disputed question, but even so,
most functioning states represent societies with a much greater commonality of
fundamental values than we can ﬁnd over the world as a whole.
With regard to both the post-modern and liberal views, Paulus’s conclusion
seems to be that there is some truth in them, but we cannot take either approach to
the extreme.
Proper international adjudication . . . will take account of the move towards individual rights
and duties in the international sphere, but will not forget that Western individualism cannot
be imposed on others; [also] it will be mindful of the relevance of political circumstances
when it applies legal prescriptions, but knows that it derives its authority from the relevant
legal sources emanating, for better or worse, from states.8

In sum, judges should just muddle through. They should also do it transparently. In
appropriate cases, ‘judges should openly admit to the indeterminacy of the sources
and the clash of the underlying principles and clearly distinguish between the
7

Paulus, A., this volume, 217.

8

Ibid. 223–4.
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constraints of law and the reasons for their adoption of a particular solution and
their preference for one principle over another.9 The hope is that if judges are
open in this way about when they are going beyond the lex lata and about their
reasons for the choices they make when they do, then they can facilitate ‘the very
international public discourse that can build and elaborate areas of international
consensus, beyond doctrinal formalism and postmodern particularism’ and can
‘not only shape the role of international law within the international community,
but will itself become part of the community building’.10
Taken as advice to judges, this is rather amorphous. (And the judges may not
feel in need of advice.) Perhaps the real usefulness of Paulus’s prescriptions is as a
reminder to us observers to be tolerant of judicial pronouncements that may not
meet our standards for scholarly argument. But amorphous or not, if I thought I
could do better than Paulus has done at describing what judges should be doing
with these two problems, I would be writing a different paper. There is just one
respect in which Paulus’s prescriptions may be unrealistic, and may actually be in
tension with one of his most interesting points elsewhere in the chapter. Paulus calls
for judges to be clear about when they are going beyond the lex lata, but judges may
not always know just when they are going beyond the lex lata (unless we think the
lex lata ends where even the slightest possibility for controversy begins, a deﬁnition
which is surely too strict). Paulus suggests (and I agree) that a virtue of having
multiple opinions supporting a judgment of the ICJ on different grounds is that this
multiplicity can reveal an ‘overlapping consensus’, in which different legal views
with different value premises converge on a common result.11 But in at least some
such cases of overlapping consensus, each concurring judge will think she is simply
announcing the lex lata, whereas the whole constellation of opinions may persuade
the observer that about that, they are all wrong.

III. Treaties and Regimes

.........................................................................................................................................................................................................
The third approach Paulus discusses is ‘functionalism’, which he describes as ‘embrac[ing] the fragmentation of international law, because more specialized systems,
such as trade law or international criminal law, can establish stronger mechanisms
of adjudication’. Surely the advantage is not just stronger adjudication, but more
precise and specialized rules—which is what makes the stronger adjudication acceptable. But whatever the advantages of specialized regimes, Paulus discusses two
possible disadvantages. He worries that specialized regimes may be committed to
the promotion of a single regime value (trade, the environment, punishment for war
criminals, protection of human rights, whatever) to the exclusion of other values;
9

Paulus, A., this volume, 221.

10

Ibid. 224.

11

Ibid. 219–20.
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and he worries that even if the regime recognizes the need to reconcile the principal
regime value with other values, the regime’s courts will be biased in favour of the
regime value (for example, construing narrowly exceptions in favour of the other values).12 Paulus focuses on regimes that are created by states through the treaty mechanism, so issues about fragmentation are closely bound up with issues about treaty
interpretation, which brings us back to the other main source of international law.
I am not persuaded that the problems Paulus discusses give much cause for
concern at present. Paulus himself mentions more examples where regime courts
have acknowledged and accommodated values other than the putative regime
value than examples where they have not. The International Law Commission
(ILC) Report on Fragmentation also concludes that ‘the emergence of special
treaty-regimes . . . has not seriously undermined legal security, predictability or the
equality of legal subjects’.13 Although the authors of the Report say ‘the emergence
of conﬂicting rules and overlapping legal regimes will undoubtedly create problems
of coordination at the international level’, and ‘no homogeneous, hierarchical
meta-system is realistically available to do away with such problems’, they seem to
be distinctly not alarmed. Speciﬁcally, they think techniques for reasoning about
treaty conﬂicts that are already embodied in the Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties go a long way towards dealing with inter-regime conﬂict. Although I
agree with the ILC in not being alarmed, I shall explain why I reject some of their
arguments about just how conﬂict of regime values is to be dealt with.
The ﬁrst of Paulus’s worries is that a specialized regime may commit itself to the
promotion of a single value and ignore all others. As a matter of fact, I am unaware
of any regime that operates this way; and so long as we focus on regimes created
by states, there is every reason to expect regimes not to operate this way, since
states, after all, have multiple interests and values. For example, the WTO explicitly
recognizes the importance of the environment and various other non-trade values
in the ‘General Exceptions’ articles of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT) and the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), and elsewhere.
(More on this in section IV.) Similarly, no international criminal court could
rationally pursue conviction of criminals to the total exclusion of defendants’ rights,
since a major reason for having a court, as opposed to summary punishment, is to
protect those rights. And so on.
Many authors, not satisﬁed with the empirical fact that extant regimes are not
focused on a single value and are not likely to be, want to argue that as a conceptual
12 There are other possible problems that have been discussed under the rubric of ‘fragmentation’, e.g.
conﬂicting judgments by different international courts on what seems to be the identical legal point, or the
possibility that a state will ﬁnd itself subject to conﬂicting obligations under different regimes; but I shall limit
myself to the issues about value conﬂict treated in the text.
13 ILC, Fragmentation of International Law: Difﬁculties Arising from the Diversiﬁcation and Expansion of
International Law (Report of the Study Group of the International Law Commission), UN General Assembly
A/CN.4/L.682, 13 Apr. 2006, paras. 492–3.
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matter regimes cannot be focused on a single value, because they must be open
to values embodied in general international law. The ILC Report, for example,
argues that a regime based on an agreement between states gets its legitimacy
from international law, and so it must acknowledge (and in particular, its disputesettlement organs must acknowledge) whatever values international law says it must
acknowledge.14 But this does not seem to me right. To be sure, we normally think
of the validity of agreements between states as grounded in international law. But
the question is whether the regime must be viewed as grounded in this way. So
far as I can see, the answer is no. Suppose we ask how international law itself is
grounded—what is the source of its validity? There are two basic possibilities: (1)
that international law is somehow self-subsistent, grounded in nothing more than
its own constitutive set of practices and attitudes; or (2) that it is grounded in
morality, or natural law, as that operates between states. But if either of these forms
of grounding is available for international law as a general system, I see no reason
why it should not be available for a narrower, speciﬁc regime as well. The regime
might be self-subsistent, grounded simply in its own constitutive set of practices
and attitudes; or it might be based directly on the inter-state morality of inter-state
agreements, without the mediation of international law. If this is right, then there is
no reason why a regime could not coherently and legitimately instruct its courts to
consider only values recognized by the positive law of the regime itself (and perhaps
also values whose consideration is required by international morality, which may
or may not include even all of what is referred to as jus cogens), to the exclusion of
other extra-regime values of international law.
A regime that instructs its courts to ignore extra-regime values is ‘self-contained’
in a certain sense, but why should we be troubled by the possibility of a regime that
is self-contained in this sense?15 We are focusing for the moment on state-created
regimes, so if the regime is self-contained, it will be because the states that created
it (who are the only states bound by its decisions) chose to create it that way. Why
not assume they knew what they were doing? The one reason for doubt might be
a suspicion that the states’ right hands may not know what their left hands are
doing. That is, there may be a trade treaty negotiated by trade ministers, and an
environmental treaty negotiated by interior ministries or foreign ministries, and so
on, with no real coordination between these governmental departments in any of
the states. But even if this happens, the problem is a political failure within each
state; it hardly seems that an international court, regime-based or otherwise, is the
right place to look for a policy-based solution.
14
15

e.g. ILC, Fragmentation of International Law, (above, n. 13) paras. 177, 193.
I say ‘self-contained in a certain sense’ because there are various things we might mean by ‘self-contained’,
some of which are acceptable even to the people who deny the possibility of self-containment in the present
sense, and some of which even I would concede are conceptually impossible. My concern here is only with the
sense of ‘self-contained’ I deﬁne in the text.
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The ILC Report advances another argument to show that regime courts are
required, in many instances, to take account of extra-regime values. This argument
appeals to article 31.3 (c) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT),
which says that in interpreting a treaty, ‘there shall be taken into account . . . any
relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties’.
Now, this does unquestionably require that non-regime values be taken into account
in some cases (at least, if the regime follows the VCLT in interpreting the regime
treaty). But just how broad the requirement is depends on a much-debated question
about the meaning of the phrase ‘the parties’ in article 31.3 (c). Does this phrase
refer to all parties to the treaty under interpretation, or does it refer only to the
parties to the particular dispute in which the question of treaty interpretation has
arisen? I shall refer to these two possibilities as the ‘all parties’ reading and the
‘dispute parties’ reading. The question which of these readings is correct may seem
too recondite to discuss in the present context, but I want to pause over it, because
doing so will reveal that there are a variety of ways in which ‘other treaties’ may be
relevant to the interpretation of the primary treaty under interpretation. This is a
point it is essential to keep in mind in a discussion of fragmentation.
Now, it seems to me that if we interpret the VCLT by VCLT principles, the
‘ordinary meaning in context’ of the phrase ‘the parties’ can only be ‘the parties to
the treaty’, which is to say, all the parties. The use of the deﬁnite article ‘the’ implies
that the relevant set of parties has already been identiﬁed, explicitly or implicitly,
earlier in the text. No set of parties has been identiﬁed explicitly for purposes of
article 31.3 (c), and the only set that can possibly have been identiﬁed implicitly
is the set of all parties to the treaty. The set of parties cannot be the parties to
‘the dispute’, because there has been no reference to a dispute. Nor does article 31
presuppose the existence of a dispute. Article 31 is of course relevant to disputes,
but what it is about in the ﬁrst instance is how treaties shall be interpreted by states
for purposes of self-application. If textual evidence for that claim is needed (aside
from the absence of any reference to a dispute), consider the reference to ‘good
faith’ in article 31.1, which would surely be superﬂuous if the primary addressees
were courts.
Nonetheless, the ILC Report opts for the ‘dispute parties’ reading of article 31.3 (c),
mainly because this reading will require other treaties to be considered more often
than will the ‘all parties’ reading.16 The ILC Report complains that if we adopt
the ‘all parties’ reading, then ‘the more the membership of a multilateral treaty
such as the WTO covered agreements expanded, the more those treaties would
be cut off from the rest of international law’.17 But ‘cut off’ is much too strong.
Even if article 31.3 (c) does not require a treaty to which only some members of
the WTO are party to be taken into account in interpreting the WTO agreements,
that does not mean that the treaty can have no possible relevance. Consider, for
16

ILC, Fragmentation of International Law (above, n. 13), para. 472.

17

Ibid., para. 471.
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example, US—Shrimp.18 In that case, the WTO Appellate Body referred to various
environmental treaties in support of its ﬁnding that sea turtles were an ‘exhaustible
natural resource’ under GATT article XX (g). The Appellate Body was not referring
to those environmental treaties because of article 31.3 (c). It did not mention
31.3 (c) in this part of its opinion; and it plainly could not rely on 31.3 (c), even
on the ‘dispute parties’ reading, because not even all parties to the dispute were
parties to all the environmental treaties. Rather, the Appellate Body could only
have been appealing to those environmental treaties as evidence concerning the
understanding of the phrase ‘natural resources’ (and what it is for a resource to be
‘exhaustible’) that was ‘in the air’ when the WTO was being negotiated. This seems
perfectly appropriate in the circumstances, even without complete identity of the
parties. The environmental treaties are facts in the world, and they are being used
just as factual evidence on the empirical question of the likely reference of a phrase
in ordinary language. (As I shall explain in a moment, this is quite different from
the role the environmental treaties would play if they came within article 31.3 (c).)
There are other ways as well that an extra-regime treaty might be relevant
as evidence on an empirical question, even though it would not come within
article 31.3 (c) on the ‘all parties’ reading or even the ‘dispute parties’ reading. For
example (and still in the WTO context), it might be an issue whether a respondent
Member really cares about turtles or is merely using an asserted concern for turtles
as a cover for protectionism. In such a case, it would be relevant, although not
dispositive, to learn from other treaties that many other states had manifested a
concern for preserving turtles, regardless of the precise identity of the parties to
those treaties. Or similarly, the existence of other treaties favouring or disfavouring
particular shrimp-ﬁshing techniques because of their effects on turtles might be
signiﬁcant evidence on the question whether some measure was ‘relating to’ turtle
conservation, or whether it was ‘necessary’ to protect turtles. This is by no means an
exhaustive list. Even for the WTO context, it is illustrative only. The general point,
to repeat, is that even the ‘all parties’ reading of article 31.3 (c) will not cut off the
courts interpreting the regime treaty from all consideration of other treaties.19
The reader may wonder why I want to insist on the ‘all parties’ reading of
article 31.3 (c), since I am willing to admit the possible relevance of treaties that
do not come within the article on this (or any) interpretation. The reason is
that extra-regime treaties may be relevant in different ways, and we should be
attentive to the question of what use may properly be made of those treaties in
18 WTO, United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/AB/R (adopted
6 Nov. 1998).
19 ILC, Fragmentation of International Law (above, n. 13). The ILC Report refers to the sort of arguments I
have just suggested for the relevance of extra-regime treaties as ‘contrived’ (para. 450). I see nothing contrived
about them. Of course, they would be contrived if they were offered in support of the wholesale relevance of
extra-regime treaties that the ILC seems to favour. But as I explain in the continuation in the text, my point
is precisely that extra-regime treaties may be relevant for different purposes in different circumstances. Such a
view hardly seems to be a ‘contrivance’.
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various circumstances. As already noted, the uses of extra-regime treaties that I
suggested above all involve considering the treaties as evidence on some empirical
question—the meaning of some phrase in general contemporary usage, or the
likely purposes of governments, or the usefulness or necessity of some particular
measure to a putative goal. The extra-regime treaties are facts in the world, after all;
and where they are relevant, just as such facts, as evidence on a disputed empirical
question, it seems obviously proper for a regime court to consider them, regardless
of identity of parties. Of course, the broader the membership of the extra-regime
treaties, and the greater the overlap with the regime membership, the weightier
evidence the extra-regime treaties will be on the sort of question I have mentioned.
But identity of parties is not necessary for the treaties to be useful as empirical
evidence.
In contrast, other uses of extra-regime treaties accord them normative signiﬁcance.
Even here, there are at least two cases to be distinguished: (1) If an extra-regime
treaty is relevant to a dispute between two regime parties because of article 30 on
successive treaties (which will be the case whenever the disputing regime parties
are both party to the extra-regime treaty), then whether we are technically under
article 30.3 or 30.4 (a), to the extent the treaties are incompatible, the later in time
will control the dispute.20 But article 30 is about the application of treaties, as its
title makes clear. It presupposes that we have already determined, in accordance
with the principles of article 31, what each treaty means; and then the question
is whether there is a conﬂict between the requirements of the treaties, and if so,
which should prevail. So, article 30 gives directions for dealing with a normative
conﬂict between treaties, but it takes the normative requirements of each treaty
individually as given. In contrast, (2) if we are in a situation where article 31.3 (c),
under whatever reading we favour, requires some ‘other treaty’ to be taken into
account in the interpretation of the primary treaty, then that other treaty exercises
a sort of ‘normative gravitational force’ on the meaning of the primary treaty being
interpreted. We should try to interpret the primary treaty so that it forms part
of a coherent overall normative structure with the other treaty. This ‘normative
gravitational force’ gives the other treaty a much stronger role in determining the
meaning of the primary treaty than it has either when it is appealed to as evidence
on some empirical issue or when we interpret the treaties separately and then apply
the ‘later in time’ rule of article 30.21
20 It may seem that this explicit endorsement of lex posterior when both treaties are relevant pays too little
attention to arguments about lex specialis and lex superior, but we can build such considerations into the analysis
of ‘compatibility’.
21 I have distinguished between cases where the issue is interpretation and cases where the issue is application.
The ILC Report suggests that issues of interpretation and conﬂicts cannot be separated (para. 412). This is true,
if the claim is that there are some cases where these issues cannot be separated, namely, cases where one treaty
is subject to a ‘normative drag’ on its interpretation from another treaty coming under 31.3 (c). But still, the
VCLT itself has distinct provisions on interpretation and application; it seems to presuppose, what also seems
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Space limitations prevent me from giving an extended example to illustrate
concretely the three ways we have now distinguished in which ‘other treaties’
may be relevant to the interpretation or application of a primary treaty. But to
summarize: (1) The ‘other treaty’ may be appealed to purely as empirical evidence
on some question relevant to the interpretation or application of the primary treaty.
This use may well be appropriate even when some parties to the dispute are not
parties to the ‘other treaty’. (2) The ‘other treaty’ may be appealed to prevent the
application of the primary treaty, if all parties to the dispute are also parties to
the other treaty and the other treaty is incompatible with, and later in time than, the
primary treaty. This is a normative use of the other treaty, and so it depends on the
parties to the dispute being parties to the other treaty, but it does not require that
all parties to the primary treaty be parties to the other treaty. The treaties should
still be interpreted independently (unless all parties to the primary treaty are also
parties to the other treaty). The reason for preferring the later treaty is not that the
treaties are presumed to form a coherent whole, but is rather a version of estoppel
(or a ﬁnding of bad faith, or abus de droit) against the party who tries to rely on the
earlier treaty after signing the incompatible later one. Finally, (3) the ‘other treaty’
may be appealed to for its ‘normative gravitational force’ on the meaning of the
primary treaty, which requires that the primary treaty be interpreted (if possible)
so as to form a coherent normative whole with the other treaty. This is appropriate
only where the parties to the primary treaty are all parties to the other treaty.
Whether or not the reader accepts all my claims about when various uses of the
‘other treaty’ are appropriate, I hope she will at least recognize that there are different
uses, and that we need to attend to the question of what the right circumstances are
for each use, instead of just discussing whether regime courts can/should/must look
to extra-regime sources without distinguishing between possible uses.

IV. Fragmentation and the WTO: Example
or Counter-Example?

.........................................................................................................................................................................................................
In this last section, I want to consider brieﬂy four suggestions that one encounters
in discussions of fragmentation: (1) that specialized regimes recognize only one
‘regime’ value; (2) that even if a regime court considers other values than its own
regime value, it will inevitably be biased in favour of the regime value (for example,
by construing narrowly treaty exceptions in favour of non-regime values); (3)
that what is needed is greater sensitivity on the part of regime courts to values
from elsewhere in international law; and (4) that if such extra-regime values are
obviously true, that there are cases where the interpretation of each of two treaties can be settled before issues of
conﬂict or application arise.
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recognized, the court will be required to ‘balance’ the regime value(s) and the
extra-regime values. I shall not attempt a general discussion, but since the WTO
is often pressed into service as an example for these various claims—both as
illustrating a problem under (1) and (2) and sometimes as illustrating a possible
solution under (3) and (4)—I want to consider brieﬂy what the WTO experience
really indicates. Incidentally, although Paulus refers to the WTO more than once,
and my comments are partly stimulated by his references, my comments should
not be taken as directed at Paulus’s claims speciﬁcally, since I do not want to discuss
just how far he is committed to each of the four propositions. Now, as to the
propositions and the WTO:
(1) It is not true that the WTO recognizes only the value of promoting trade. As
the Appellate Body reminds us in Shrimp, the Preamble to the WTO Agreement
makes speciﬁc reference to the value of the environment, via the phrase ‘sustainable
development’. In addition, GATT article XX and GATS article XIV (both entitled
‘General Exceptions’) recognize a number of non-trade values that can justify
national measures that would otherwise violate the GATT or GATS—including
‘public morals’ (which the Appellate Body has signalled it will interpret very
generously),22 ‘human, animal or plant life or health’, ‘protection of national
treasures of artistic, historic, or archaeological value’ (in GATT), and ‘privacy’ (in
GATS).23 Similarly, there are references to the environment and other non-trade
values in the Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement, the Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Measures Agreement (SPS), the Agriculture Agreement, and so on. There is a sense
in which the core purpose of the GATT was, and the core purpose of the WTO is,
to promote trade. But we must be careful how we understand this claim. There is
nothing in the texts to suggest that trade is valued in such a way that more trade
is always better. The focus of the system is not on increasing trade by forbidding
or even disfavouring all national measures that reduce trade. Rather, the focus is
on restraining or eliminating certain sorts of national measures that distort trade.
Some of the measures that are forbidden are in fact trade-promoting, as in the case
of export subsidies. There is much controversy, to be sure, about what amounts to
a ‘distortion’, and trade experts sometimes speak as if any reduction of trade is a
distortion. But wiser heads have always rejected such a view. And to repeat, there is
nothing to suggest such a ‘trade above all’ view in the WTO texts.
(2) The WTO is also a counter-example to the claim of inevitable bias on the part
of regime courts in favour of the ‘regime value’. It is true that many GATT Panels
22 See WTO, United States—Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services,
WT/DS285/AB/R (adopted 20 Apr. 2005).
23 In my own view (admittedly not uncontroversial), a proper interpretation of the basic prohibitory
provisions of the GATT and GATS imposes essentially no limit on the purposes that can be pursued by Member
States, even at the cost of a reduction in trade, provided the measures are facially neutral and not adopted with a
protectionist purpose (and in the case of GATS, do not involve quotas).

238

donald h. regan

(from the days before the formation of the WTO) seemed to be biased in favour of
trade. The worst examples are the two Tuna-Dolphin cases, which unfortunately are
all that many people know about the WTO (even to the exclusion of the Appellate
Body’s very different treatment of the same basic problem in Shrimp). The TunaDolphin reports were indefensible, but they were not adopted by the Contracting
Parties to the GATT and never became part of the GATT acquis. Even under the
GATT, some Panels were considerably more sensitive to non-trade values, although
I would not contest the claim that overall, GATT Panels showed an unfortunate
pro-trade bias. But with the advent of the WTO and the Appellate Body, things
have changed dramatically.
The Appellate Body cannot plausibly be accused of trade bias. Of course there are
particular decisions of the Appellate Body that environmentalists and other sections
of the global audience loudly disapprove of—most salient is EC-Hormones.24 But
on the whole (and even in Hormones) the Appellate Body has done a remarkably
fair-minded job of interpreting and applying the WTO treaties, which as I have
explained are not essentially biased in favour of trade. There is a great deal in
Hormones that is very regulator-friendly: for example, the Appellate Body holds
that a Member need not do required risk assessments itself, but can rely on risk
assessments carried out by others; it says that the risk assessment can be in qualitative
terms rather than quantitative; it says a goal of zero-risk is acceptable (provided the
risk in question is not purely ‘theoretical’); it says a Member can rely on respectable
minority scientiﬁc opinion; and more. The problem in Hormones was that for some
aspects of the EC regulations, there simply were no supporting risk assessments
at all as required by the SPS. The EC tried unsuccessfully to excuse this lack by
appeal to the ‘precautionary principle’; but in a peculiar argumentative move, the
EC refused to rely on the particular provision of the SPS that explicitly embodies a
version of the precautionary principle. Even Hormones is no real evidence of trade
bias in the Appellate Body.
I cannot discuss here all the Appellate Body’s decisions that touch on the
environment or other values. But let me point out that two important recent
cases are counter-examples to the speciﬁc claim that exceptions in favour of nontrade values will be construed narrowly. In US—Shrimp the Appellate Body was
interpreting the ‘General Exceptions’ article of the GATT when it eventually upheld
the United States’ revised import ban on shrimp harvested with turtle-endangering
methods;25 and in US—Gambling, the Appellate Body treated as matters of ‘public
morals’ under the ‘General Exceptions’ article of the GATS: preventing underage gambling, preventing compulsive gambling, preventing fraud, and preventing
24 WTO, EC—Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), WT/DS26&48/AB/R (adopted
13 Feb. 1998).
25 WTO, United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products (Recourse to Article 21.5),
WT/DS58/AB/RW (adopted 21 Nov. 2001).
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money-laundering. Indeed, the Appellate Body has explicitly rejected the idea that
exceptions are to be read narrowly. It has said, quite correctly, that exceptions are
as essential to the structure of the treaty as any other provisions, and they are to be
read in the same way as other provisions.26 It is striking that the greater legalization
of the dispute-settlement process that was part of the establishment of the WTO in
1995 has led to reduced trade bias in decisions made under a treaty that is portrayed
as being all about promoting trade. But to my mind this makes perfect sense. Much
more than under GATT, dispute settlement is now about serious interpretation of
the treaty by traditional means. What is being revealed is that the treaty was never
the pure pro-trade instrument of the trade-sceptic’s horror story.27
(3) Is the sensitivity of the Appellate Body to non-trade values the result of their
taking into account the normative demands of extra-regime treaties, either in
interpretation or application of the WTO agreements? So far as I can see, the answer
is no. I have already argued that in Shrimp, when the Appellate Body refers to other
treaties in connection with the interpretation of the phrase ‘exhaustible natural
resources’, it is using those treaties only as evidence on an empirical question. That
is, it is treating them as facts in the world, not as sources of relevant norms. It is
also often suggested that in a different part of the Shrimp opinion, the Appellate
Body relies on normative support from other environmental treaties to ﬁnd a duty
to negotiate. Just what the Appellate Body says about negotiation is far from clear,
and this is not the place for an extended discussion. My own view is that they do
not ﬁnd a duty to negotiate at all, but only a duty not to discriminate by negotiating
with some affected countries and not others. (They may also have in mind a slightly
different non-discrimination duty, as explained in the next footnote.) The central
point in favour of this reading is that the bit of article XX that the Appellate Body
ﬁnds the United States has run afoul of is about ‘unjustiﬁable discrimination’. This
treaty language simply would not support a ﬁnding of an unconditional duty to
negotiate. And if the Appellate Body did not ﬁnd a duty to negotiate, they can hardly
have relied on other treaties in ﬁnding such a duty.28
26 WTO, EC—Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products, WT/DS135/AB/R (adopted
5 Apr. 2001).
27 Arguably, one of the reasons for the decline in trade bias was that the early Appellate Body members were
not all trade lawyers, but included general international lawyers and an EU lawyer. But to my mind, the reason
this was important is not the greater sensitivity of these members to extra-regime values as such, but rather their
greater attention to what the WTO agreements themselves actually said about non-trade values.
28 This does leave the question of why the Appellate mentions the other treaties at all—and frankly I am not
certain there is an explanation that makes the reference to the other treaties anything more than window-dressing.
The best explanation I can think of is that the other treaties conﬁrmed the empirical usefulness of talking to
other countries about what techniques of turtle protection were needed in different shrimping grounds. This is
relevant because the Appellate Body opinion suggests that perhaps the failure to negotiate with Malaysia was not
just illegal because of the more favourable negotiation treatment of the Caribbean countries, but also because
the failure to ‘negotiate’ at least to the extent of exchanging technical information exacerbated the distinct
discrimination (according to the Appellate Body) involved in requiring Malaysia to use a turtle-protection
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(4) Finally, does the Appellate Body in Shrimp balance the value of the environment
against the value of trade? No, it does not. It does not even claim to.29 If the
Appellate Body is balancing any value against the value of trade, it is not the value
of the environment, but rather the value of national regulatory autonomy—which
the United States is using in this case to protect the environment, but which is
hardly the same thing. But I would say they are not balancing at all; they are simply
interpreting the limits on national regulatory autonomy in the treaty. To see that
the Appellate Body does not balance the environment and trade, observe that they
do not impose any conclusion of their own about the proper ‘balance’ on any
Member. Rather, they leave it up to each member to balance for itself in respect of
its own production and its imports. On the one hand, the Appellate Body eventually
upholds the United States’ revised turtle-protective import regulations; but on
the other hand, it does not require Malaysia to adopt turtle-protective shrimping
techniques, nor could it conceivably do so under the agreements. Indeed, by
apparently requiring the United States to offer shipment-by-shipment certiﬁcation
for shrimp from non-certiﬁed countries, the Appellate Body carefully guarantees
that Malaysia can both sell turtle-friendly shrimp into the United States market (if it
so chooses) and continue to harvest shrimp by turtle-hostile techniques for its own
or third country markets. So, the Appellate Body never chooses for itself between
trade and the environment. It ﬁnds (correctly) that the treaty leaves the choice up
to each Member in its treaty-deﬁned sphere.
Paulus suggests that in cases of value conﬂict, we cannot fully trust regime courts.
Even if they appear to take account of extra-regime values, he still wants them to
be supervised by extra-regime international courts as ‘neutral arbiters’ between the
competing values and the associated interests.30 In other words, faced with a conﬂict
between trade and the environment, for example, Paulus wants to move ‘upwards’
from the WTO to a systematic international law. In fact, as we see in Shrimp, we
move ‘downwards’ from the WTO back to the several Member states (whose choices
remain subject, of course, to the WTO’s various non-discrimination principles and
the like).
In the WTO context, this ‘downwards move’ is the right move, even though it
would not be in many other contexts. The WTO is a very distinctive regime, not
technique that was actually unnecessary in the waters their shrimpers frequented. Still, there is no evidence at all
that the Appellate Body found a duty to negotiate in other treaties and imported it into the WTO, or even that
they gave any normative weight to the other treaties.
29 The Appellate Body does talk about balancing, but what it claims to balance is the complaining
member’s ‘rights’ against the respondent member’s duties. (para. 156 ff.) Even this talk of balancing is logically
inappropriate, since the only rights created by the WTO agreements are the Hohfeldian correlates of the duties the
agreements impose on other member countries, and such correlates obviously cannot be ‘balanced’ against each
other. (The agreements may create some non-correlative rights like the right to invoke the dispute-settlement
process, but that is clearly a different sort of issue.)
30 Paulus, A., this volume, 214.
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so much because it is devoted to the value of trade, which we have seen is true in
only a limited sense, but because the only national laws it purports to constrain
are laws that directly affect trade. Its speciﬁc concern is with those laws’ trade
effects, which consist of allowing or prohibiting market transactions. This is quite
unlike international environmental law, say, which concerns itself with physical
cross-border effects that are not market-mediated. Such physical effects may result
from behavior undertaken for commercial purposes, but the effects themselves
move independently of any market transactions. Efﬂuents dumped into a river by
an upstream country affect the downstream country even if the countries have no
trading relationship. It is the WTO’s focus on market-mediated effects that makes
the ‘downwards move’ apt, although I have no space for a full explanation here.31
That also means, of course, that the downwards move is not a solution for the
problems of many other international regimes.
So, I am not holding up the WTO as a model of how all regimes should operate.
But since the WTO often appears in discussions of fragmentation, it seems desirable
to understand how it actually operates. Also, the Appellate Body’s ‘judicial restraint’
with regard to balancing competing values may be suggestive for other areas.
Many writers move too easily from the premise that we need a lot more effective
international law than we currently have, which is certainly true, to the problematic
conclusion that since no other institution is currently able to give it to us, judges
should step in to supply our need.
31 See Regan, D., ‘What Are Trade Agreements For?—Two Conﬂicting Stories Told by Economists, With a
Lesson for Lawyers’, Journal of International Economic Law, 9/4 (2006), 951.

